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Abstract. Legal and constitutional theory has focused chiefly on the risk that voters and 
legislators will trust an ill-motivated executive. This paper addresses the risk that voters 
and legislators will fail to trust a well-motivated executive. Absent some credible signal 
of benign motivations, voters will be unable to distinguish good from bad executives and 
will thus withhold discretion that they would have preferred to grant, making all 
concerned worse off. We suggest several mechanisms with which a well-motivated 
executive can credibly signal his type, including independent commissions within the 
executive branch; bipartisanship in appointments to the executive branch, or more 
broadly the creation of domestic coalitions of the willing; the related tactic of counter-
partisanship, or choosing policies that run against the preferences of the president’s own 
party; commitments to multilateral action in foreign policy; increasing the transparency 
of the executive’s decisionmaking processes; and a regime of strict liability for executive 
abuses. We explain the conditions under which these mechanisms succeed or fail, with 
historical examples. 
 
Introduction: Discretion and Distrust 
 The modern executive enjoys enormous discretion to make policy, in the United 
States and elsewhere. In normal times, voters and legislatures grant the executive legal 
discretion because delegation is a sensible strategy, given the executive’s advantages in 
expertise and the legislature’s constricted agenda. Statutory delegations, both broad and 
vague, accumulate. Legislatures also grant the executive effective discretion through 
inaction and sheer passivity; where legislative gridlock vitiates any real threat that 
executive action will be overridden, the executive has discretion to take unilateral action.1 
In emergencies, and in the areas of foreign policy and national security, even more 
discretion flows to the executive because its institutional advantages in speed, 
decisiveness, force and secrecy become pronounced, and because power must be 
concentrated to meet threats. 
                                                 
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. 
** Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Jacob Gersen, Jack Goldsmith, William Howell, John 
Manning, and Matthew Stephenson for helpful comments, and to Josh MacLeod and Abby Wood for 
helpful research assistance.  
1 Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
132, 146-48 (1999). 
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 With discretion comes distrust.2 Voters and legislators grant the executive 
discretion, through action or inaction, and increase executive discretion during 
emergencies, because they believe that the benefits of doing so outweigh the risks of 
executive abuse.3 By the same token, political actors will attempt to constrain the 
executive, or will simply fail to grant powers they otherwise would have preferred to 
grant, where they believe that the risks and harms of abuses outweigh any benefits in 
security or other goods. The fear of executive abuse arises from many sources, but the 
basic problem is uncertainty about the executive’s motivations. The executive may, for 
example, be a power-maximizer, intent on using legal or factual discretion to harm 
political opponents and cement his political position, or that of his political party; or he 
may be an empire-builder, interested in expanding his turf at the expense of other 
institutions.  
 Where the executive is indeed ill-motivated in any of these ways, constraining its 
discretion (more than the voters would otherwise choose) may be sensible. But the 
executive may not be ill-motivated at all. Where the executive would in fact be a faithful 
agent, using his increased discretion to promote the public good according to whatever 
conception of the public good voters hold, then constraints on executive discretion are all 
cost and no benefit. Voters, legislators, and judges know that different executive officials 
have different motivations. Not all presidents are power-maximizers or empire-builders.4 
Of course, the executive need not be pure of heart; his devotion to the public interest may 
in turn be based on concern for the judgment of history. But so long as that motivation 
makes him a faithful agent of the principal(s), he counts as well-motivated. 
The problem, however, is that the public has no simple way to know which type 
of executive it is dealing with. An ill-motivated executive will just mimic the statements 
of a well-motivated one, saying the right things and offering plausible rationales for 
policies that outsiders, lacking crucial information, find difficult to evaluate—policies 
that turn out not to be in the public interest. The ability of the ill-motivated executive to 
mimic the public-spirited executive’s statements gives rise to the executive’s dilemma of 
credibility: the well-motivated executive has no simple way to identify himself as such. 
Distrust causes voters (and the legislators they elect) to withhold discretion that they 
would like to grant and that the well-motivated executive would like to receive. Of course 
the ill-motivated executive might also want discretion; the problem is that voters who 
would want to give discretion (only) to the well-motivated executive may choose not to 
do so, because they are not sure what type he actually is. The risk that the public and 
legislators will fail to trust a well-motivated president is just as serious as the risk that 
                                                 
2 We use “trust” and “credibility” as synonyms. In other words, we adopt a rationalist account of trust 
rather than a nonrational or affective account, and thus follow the lead of Russell Hardin. RUSSELL 
HARDIN, TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS, 13-21 (2d ed. 2004). However, as will become apparent, we do 
not subscribe to Hardin’s pessimism about the ability of institutions to successfully generate credibility in 
modern mass democracies. See id., at 151-172. For an overview of competing accounts of political trust, 
see Mark E. Warren, Democratic Theory and Trust, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST, 310-45 (Mark E. Warren 
ed., 1999). 
3 Philippe Aghion, et al. Endogenous Political Institutions, 119 Q.J. ECON. 565 (2004).  
4 Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 919-20 
(2005).  
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they will trust an ill-motivated president, yet legal scholars have felled forests on the 
second topic while largely neglecting the first.5 
 Our aim in this paper is to identify this dilemma of credibility that afflicts the 
well-motivated executive and to propose mechanisms for ameliorating it; we focus on 
emergencies and national security, but cast the analysis within a broader framework. Our 
basic claim is that the credibility dilemma can be addressed by executive signaling. 
Without any new constitutional amendments, statutes, or legislative action, law and 
executive practice already contains resources sufficient to allow a well-motivated 
executive to send a credible signal of his motivations, committing to use increased 
discretion in public-spirited ways. By tying policies to institutional mechanisms that 
impose heavier costs on ill-motivated actors than on well-motivated ones, the well-
motivated executive can credibly signal his good intentions and thus persuade voters that 
his policies are those that voters would want if fully informed. We focus particularly on 
mechanisms of executive self-binding that send a signal of credibility by committing 
presidents to actions or policies that only a well-motivated president would adopt. 
The discussion is structured as follows. Part I lays out examples of the credibility 
dilemma, both historical and recent. Part II analyzes the credibility dilemma through the 
lens of principal-agent theory. Part III examines the attempted Madisonian solution to the 
credibility dilemma, and explains why it is a failure, for the most part. Part IV suggests a 
series of mechanisms for credibly demonstrating the executive’s good intentions. These 
mechanisms include independent commissions within the executive branch; 
bipartisanship in appointments to the executive branch, or more broadly the creation of 
domestic coalitions of the willing; the related tactic of counter-partisanship, or choosing 
policies that run against the preferences of the president’s own party; commitments to 
multilateral action in foreign policy; increasing the transparency of the executive’s 
decisionmaking processes; and a regime of strict liability for executive abuses. Not all of 
these mechanisms succeed, and all of them succeed under some conditions but fail under 
others. We attempt to identify the conditions under which one or the other mechanism 
can improve executive credibility. 
 
                                                 
5 In legal scholarship, the closest precedent for our work is Michael Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the 
Modern State: Why a Unitary, Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 
144 U. PA. L REV 827, 878-91 (1996). However, Fitts does not use a rational choice approach, as we do, 
but focuses on matters of public psychology—for example, that the public wants powerful presidents to 
resolve disputes but then feels resentful when the dispute is not resolved in the desired manner. Id. at 839, 
864-68. We abstract from such issues. There is also a related literature in administrative law that implicitly 
argues that the president can be trusted but does not address the dilemma of executive credibility that is our 
focus. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Nondelegation: A Post-mortem, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1331, 1344 (2003); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for 
Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 95-97 (2005). Matthew Stephenson 
also discusses problems of reliability of courts and members of Congress. See Matthew C. Stephenson, 
Court of Public Opinion: Government Accountability and Judicial Independence, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
379, 380-81(2004). Overall, the strand of political science literature that has had most influence on the legal 
academia has focused on the problem of executive overreaching. See, e.g., CLINTON ROSSITER, THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, 44-73 (1956); EDWARD CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWER, 1787–
1984, 303-45 (4th ed. 1957). Other work in political science, especially its rational choice analysis of 
institutions, is more directly relevant; we cite this work as appropriate in the body of the discussion.  
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I. Examples 
 Presidents always have some credibility, at least at the start of their term. People 
do not vote for candidates whom they do not believe, and so the winning candidate brings 
to the office some amount of credibility, which he may further enhance over time by 
keeping his promises or making predictions that are proven correct by events. Having 
built up capital, some presidents find it useful to engage in deception, and some have 
gotten away with it, at least in the short term. Prominent examples include FDR’s claim 
during the 1940 election that he had no intention of bringing the United States into war;6 
Eisenhower’s denial that U-2 spy planes overflew the Soviet Union;7 (probably) 
Johnson’s description of the Gulf of Tonkin incident;8 Nixon’s statements about military 
incursions in Cambodia;9 (probably) Reagan’s claim that he was unaware of the arms-for-
hostages scheme;10 and Clinton’s denial that he had had a “sexual relationship” with 
Monica Lewinsky.11 But deception is potentially a costly strategy, because revelation of 
the deception damages the president’s credibility, making it more difficult for him 
achieve his next set of goals. 
 For this reason, we focus on historical cases where the president avoids deception, 
where in fact he makes a true or roughly true statement about circumstances that the 
public cannot directly evaluate, but has trouble persuading the public to believe him. In 
these cases, the president needs to use mechanisms that enhance his credibility or, if he 
cannot, finds himself unable to act. We offer examples to illustrate the credibility 
dilemma, to illustrate a range of solutions to the dilemma – some successful, some 
otherwise – and to show that the mechanisms we will propose in Part IV have historical 
analogues or precedents. 
A. FDR: The Nazi Threat 
 Franklin Delano Roosevelt understood the threat posed by Nazi Germany to the 
United States’ long-term interests long before the U.S. public did. The public was 
preoccupied with the Great Depression and had powerful isolationist representatives in 
Congress. Because of popular sentiment, FDR could not commit U.S. military assistance 
to Britain and France even after Germany invaded France and began bombing London.12 
Marginal economic and military assistance could take place only through complicated 
subterfuges and was in any event of minimal value. 
 Even after Japan bombed Pearl Harbor and Nazi Germany declared war on the 
United States, FDR had to move cautiously. The public supported war, but sought war 
primarily with Japan, while FDR correctly believed that Germany posed a greater threat 
to the United States than Japan did – for, in FDR’s view, Japan could be, and should be, 
dealt with after the Atlantic alliance against Germany was solidified. Thus, although FDR 
had popular support on one level, he needed to devise ways to ensure support for his 
                                                 
6 WAYNE S. COLE, ROOSEVELT & THE ISOLATIONISTS 1932-45 397 (1987). 
7 STEPHEN AMBROSE, EISENHOWER, THE PRESIDENT, VOLUME TWO 513-15 (1984). 
8 Walter LaFeber, Johnson, Vietnam, and Tocqueville, in LYNDON JOHNSON CONFRONTS THE WORLD: 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1963-1968 49 (Warren I. Cohen & Nancy Bernkopf Tucker eds., 1994). 
9 STEPHEN AMBROSE , NIXON, VOLUME THREE: RUIN AND RECOVERY 1973-1990 178, 182, 198 (1991),  
10 LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FIREWEALL: THE IRAN-CONTRA CONSPIRACY AND COVER-UP 231-32 (1997). 
11 HAYNES JOHNSON, THE BEST OF TIMES, 227 (2001). 
12 COLE, supra n. 6 at 239. 
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particular war aims and strategies, whose particular justifications would always remain at 
least partially obscure to the public. One of FDR’s tactics for generating support was to 
invite prominent Republicans into his cabinet. Henry Stimson was given the post of 
Secretary of War, and Frank Knox was made the Secretary of the Navy.13 Provided with 
inside information, they would be able to blow the whistle if U.S. war strategy departed 
too much from what they believed was the public interest. 
B. Truman: Scaring the Hell out of the Country 
 The Soviet Union had been the United States’ ally during World War II, and 
many people, including FDR, expected or hoped that it would cooperate with the United 
States after the war as well. That the Soviet Union would have aggressive rather than 
pacific designs only gradually dawned on U.S. elites. By 1946, skepticism about Soviet 
motives was widespread in the U.S. government, but the U.S. public still labored under 
more genial impressions fostered by wartime propaganda. To counter the growing Soviet 
threat, President Harry S. Truman resolved to expend U.S. treasure to rebuild the 
economies of France, West Germany, Britain, and other potential allies, and to bind them 
together in a military defense pact. The former would require a lot of money; the latter 
would require the stationing of U.S. troops abroad. The U.S. public, however, was 
traditionally isolationist, and wished to enjoy the victory and the peace.14 How could 
Truman persuade the public that further sacrifice and foreign entanglements would be 
necessary to defend U.S. interests against a former ally? 
 Truman apparently could not simply explain to the public that the Soviet threat 
justified the Marshall Plan and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States’ 
first permanent foreign military alliance. The problem is that the public had no way to 
evaluate the Soviet threat. The U.S.S.R. had not actually used military force against U.S. 
troops, as the Japanese had five years earlier at Pearl Harbor. The Soviet Union was 
instead supporting communist insurgencies in Greece and Turkey, interfering in politics 
in Italy, violating its promise to respect democratic processes in Poland, engaging in 
espionage, and so forth. Experienced and perceptive observers saw a threat, but, generally 
speaking, the public was in no position to do so. 
 To enhance the credibility of his claims about the Soviet threat, Truman did two 
things. First, he recast the threat as an ideological challenge. Truman gave the threat an 
ideological dimension so that any expression of skepticism could be construed as 
treachery rather than honest disagreement.15 Second, he made an alliance with a powerful 
Republican senator, Arthur Vandenberg, who could assure Truman that the Republicans 
would not object to his policies as long as he consulted them and allowed them some 
influence. As a former isolationist, Vandenberg’s endorsement of Truman’s policy of 
                                                 
13 Id. at 367-69. 
14 Stanley R. Sloan, Negotiating Article 5, NATO REV. (Summer 2006),  
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue2/english/art4.html.  
15 See Truman Presidential Museum & Library, Ideological Foundations of the Cold War, 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/; see also U.S. Department of State's 
Bureau of International Information Programs, Chapter 12: Postwar America in OUTLINE OF U.S. HISTORY, 
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/histryotln/postwar.htm. 
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engagement must have enhanced the credibility of Truman’s claims about the Soviet 
threat.16 
 Both of these strategies succeeded, but neither was costless. Truman’s 
characterization of the Soviet threat as an ideological challenge may have led to the 
McCarthy era and suppressed public debate about foreign policy. Truman’s alliance with 
the Republicans meant, of course, that he would have less freedom of action.17 
C. Bush I versus Bush II: The Iraqi Threat 
 George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush both went to war with Iraq, but they 
faced different threats and chose different responses. George H. W. Bush sought to drive 
Iraqi military forces out of Kuwait. His problem was persuading the U.S. public that a 
U.S. military response was justified. In retrospect it might seem that he was clearly right, 
but at the time the common estimation was that tens of thousands of U.S. troops would be 
killed.18 This was the expected cost of a military response. On the benefit side, Bush 
could appeal to the sanctity of sovereign borders, but public sympathy for the rich 
Kuwaitis was limited. The United States’ real concern was that Iraq would, with 
Kuwait’s oil fields, become wealthy and powerful enough to expand its control over the 
region, threaten Saudi Arabia, dominate the Persian Gulf’s oil reserves, and pose a long-
term threat to the western economies and the United States’ influence in the Middle East. 
But all of these concerns are rather abstract, and it was never obvious that the public 
would accept this case. Indeed, the congressional authorization to use military force was 
far from unanimous in the House of Representatives.19 
 The credibility of Bush’s claims, however, was greatly aided by international 
support. The public support of nations with divergent interests showed that Bush’s claim 
about the internationally destabilizing effects of Saddam Hussein’s invasion were real 
and not imagined. Thus any claim that a U.S. military invasion was solely in Bush’s 
partisan political interests, or in the interests of oil companies, was seriously weakened. 
Formal United Nations approval and the military assistance of foreign states—which was 
of mainly political, not military significance—further solidified Bush’s credibility.20 
 Surface similarities aside, George W. Bush faced a different kind of threat. He 
feared that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, which he would give or 
sell to terrorist groups like al Qaeda. It was more difficult for George W. Bush to prove 
that Saddam had WMDs than for his father to prove that Saddam was a threat to the 
region, because any WMDs were hidden on Saddam’s territory while the invasion of 
Kuwait could be observed by all. George W. Bush followed the same strategy that his 
father did, albeit somewhat less enthusiastically: to enlist international support in order to 
bolster the credibility of his claim that Saddam continued to pose a major threat to U.S. 
and western interests. But George W. Bush failed to persuade foreign countries that 
                                                 
16 See RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS OF 
LEADERSHIP, 40-49 (1990); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, 128 (1973).  
17 SCHLESINGER, supra n.16, at 129-130. 
18 STEPHEN R. GRAUBARD, MR. BUSH’S WAR: ADVENTURES IN THE POLITICS OF ILLUSION 9, 122 (1992). 
19 The House vote on Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. 120-1, 105 
Stat. 3 (1991) passed by fewer than 70 votes (250-183). The Senate vote was unanimous. 
20 GRAUBARD, supra, n. 18, at 177-18. 
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Saddam posed a great enough threat to justify a military invasion (although they largely 
agreed that he either had or probably had WMDs), and he did not obtain significant 
international support.21 Ironically, George W. Bush, unlike his father, had strong 
congressional support, in part because opposition to the first war turned out to be a 
political liability, and the costs of the first war (unlike the second war) turned out to be so 
low. 
D. Clinton: Wag the Dog 
 Long before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government understood 
that al Qaeda posed a threat to U.S. interests. The CIA had established a bin Laden office 
in 1996, and the Clinton administration was trying to develop an effective 
counterterrorism strategy.22 In 1998 al Qaeda blew up U.S. embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania, whereupon Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes on targets in Afghanistan and 
Sudan. Just three days earlier, however, Clinton had announced on national television 
that he had had an affair with Monica Lewinsky. Opponents charged that he ordered the 
strikes in order to distract the public from his domestic problems.23 This came to be 
known as the Wag the Dog strategy after a movie that featured a similar subterfuge.24 
 Clinton’s credibility problem was more acute than that of earlier presidents. FDR, 
Truman, and George H. W. Bush (as well as, later, George W. Bush) might embark on 
foreign adventures in order to enhance their prestige or to pay off interest groups or to 
distract the public from domestic problems. George W. Bush, for example, has been 
repeatedly accused of manipulating terrorism warnings in order to improve poll results or 
electoral outcomes.25 But only in Clinton’s case was it necessary for him to make an 
important and visible decision about foreign policy in the midst of a personal scandal in 
which he admitted that he engaged in deceit, with the result that his ability to conduct an 
effective terrorism defense was hampered by doubts about his credibility.26 An aggressive 
response to al Qaeda would have to wait until after September 11, 2001. 
II. Theory 
A. The Problem 
 The examples we have discussed have a common structure. A nation or group like 
Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, Iraq, or al Qaeda poses a threat to U.S. interests. The 
                                                 
21 See Alan Beattie, US may present new resolution this week; White House Determined to Disarm Saddam 
Even if Widespread International Support Withheld, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2003, at 6. 
22 Counterterrorism Policy: Eighth public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States, March 24, 2004 3-7 (Testimony of Samuel L. Berger, Former Asst. to President for Nat’l 
Security Aff.), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/berger_statement.pdf.  
23 JAMES PATTERSON, RESTLESS GIANT, 380-83 & 392-93 (2005); HAYNES JOHNSON, supra n. at 406. 
24 Id. 
25 See Rob Willer, The Effect of Government-Issued Terror Warnings on Presidential Approval Ratings, 10 
CURRENT RESEARCH SOC. PO.’Y 1, 5, 10 (2004). 
26 Richard Clarke, Clinton’s counterterrorism chief, suggests that Clinton was not affected by politics, at 
least for the initial decision to strike. See RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA’S 
WAR ON TERROR, 186 (2004). But then he says: “Our response to two deadly terrorist attacks was an 
attempt to wipe out al Qaeda leadership, yet it quickly became grist for the right-wing talk radio mill and 
part of the Get Clinton campaign. That reaction made it more difficult to get approval for follow-up attacks 
on al Qaeda, such as my later attempts to persuade the Principals to forget about finding bin Laden and just 
bomb training camps.” Id. at 189. 
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threat is widely understood at a general level but the public does not understand 
important details: why the threat exists, its magnitude, what programs will best address it. 
The president believes that a particular program—NSA surveillance, unlimited detention, 
military preparation—is necessary and desirable for countering the threat, and let us 
assume that he is correct. At the same time, the program could be misused in various 
ways. It could be used to enhance the power of the president at the expense of legitimate 
political opponents; to pay off the president’s supporters at the expense of the general 
public; or to spark an emotional but short-lived surge of patriotism that benefits the 
president during an important election but does not enhance security. The president can 
announce the program and justify it in general terms, but he cannot design the program in 
such a way that its dangers to legitimate political opposition can be eliminated.27 As a 
result, his claim that the program will be used only for national security, and not to 
enhance his power at the expense of political opponents, or to benefit allies, may not be 
believed. 
 Consider, for example, the policy of detaining suspected members of al Qaeda 
without charging them and providing them with a trial. The public understands that al 
Qaeda poses a threat to national security but lacks the information necessary to evaluate 
the detention policy. The public does not know the magnitude of the continuing threat 
from al Qaeda: it might be the case that the group has focused its attention on foreign 
targets, that it no longer has the capacity to launch attacks on U.S. soil, that greater 
international cooperation and intelligence sharing has significantly reduce the threat, and 
so forth. The public also does not know whether the detainees are important members of 
al Qaeda or foot soldiers or unconnected to al Qaeda; whether the dangerous detainees 
could be adequately incapacitated or deterred through regular criminal processes; whether 
the Bush administration obtains valuable intelligence from the detainees, as it claims, or 
not; whether the detainees are treated well or harshly; and numerous other relevant 
factors. Some of the relevant variables are public, but most are not; those that are public 
are nonetheless extremely difficult to evaluate. Consider the ambiguity over whether the 
suicides at Guantánamo Bay in June 2006 were driven by despair and harsh treatment, or 
were the result of a calculated effort by martyr-seeking Jihadists to score a propaganda 
coup.28 As a general matter, the public does not even know whether the absence of major 
terrorist attacks on U.S. soil since September 11, 2001 resulted from the Bush 
administration’s detention policy, at least partly resulted from this policy, occurred for 
reasons entirely independent of this policy such as (say) the military attack on 
Afghanistan, or occurred despite the detention policy, which, by alienating potential 
allies, perversely made a further attack more likely than it would otherwise have been.  
 Described in this manner, the president’s credibility problem is the result of an 
agency relationship, where the president is an agent and the public is the principal. In 
agency models, the agent has the power to engage in an action that benefits or harms a 
principal. In a typical version of these models, the principal first hires the agent and 
instructs the agent to engage in high effort rather than shirk. The agent then chooses 
                                                 
27 Often, as in the case of surveillance of terrorist communications by the National Security Agency, the 
president cannot even announce the program, for to do so would reduce or eliminate its value, but must 
anticipate that the secret will eventually come out, in which case he will have to defend it. 
28 Jonathan Mahler, Terms of Imprisonment, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, at 6..  
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whether to engage in high effort or shirk. High effort by the agent increases the 
probability that the principal will receive a high payoff, but some randomness is 
involved, so that the link between the agent’s effort and the principal’s payoff is 
stochastic rather than certain. If the agent’s behavior can be observed and proven before a 
court, then the simple solution is for the two parties to enter a contract requiring the agent 
to engage in high effort. If the agent’s behavior cannot be observed, then a contract 
requiring high effort is unenforceable, and instead the principal and agent might enter a 
contract that makes the agent’s compensation a function of the principal’s payoff. This 
gives the agent an incentive to use the high level of effort, though depending on various 
conditions, this incentive might be weak.29 
 Less important than the details of the agency model, and its various solutions, is 
the way that it clarifies the basic problem. The president is the agent and the public is the 
principal (sometimes we will think of the legislature as the principal, bracketing 
questions of agency slack between voters and legislators). The public cares about national 
security but also cares about civil liberties and the well-being of potential targets of the 
war on terror; its optimal policy trades off these factors. However, the public cannot 
directly choose the policy; instead, it delegates that power to the government and, in 
particular, the president. The president knows the range of options available, their likely 
effects, their expected costs and benefits—thanks to the resources and expertise of the 
executive branch—and so, if he is well-motivated, he will choose the best measures 
available. 
 Thus a well-motivated executive, in our sense, is an executive who chooses the 
policies that voters would choose if they knew what the executive knows.30 This 
definition does not require that the president’s deeper motives be pure; for our purposes, 
a well-motivated president may be concerned with his historical reputation in the long 
run, as many presidents are. Because presidents know that in the long run most or all of 
their currently private information will be revealed,31 a concern with the judgment of 
history pushes presidents to make the decisions that future generations, knowing what the 
president knows now, will approve. To be sure, the concern with historical reputation is 
not perfectly congruent with doing what the current generation would approve of (with 
full information), because different generations have different values, as in the case of 
civil rights. The convergence is substantial, however, compared to far more harmful 
motivations a president might have, such as short-term empire-building or partisan 
advantage. Presidents with a concern for long-run reputation may not be disinterested 
                                                 
29 For a textbook treatment see PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY, 14-20, 
129-170 (2005). 
30 On some views, “what the voters would choose” is what the median voter would choose. See ANTHONY 
DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 115-122 (1957). Our argument does not depend on this 
particular theory; it depends only on the assumption that there is some coherent criterion of public 
preference based on some aggregation of citizens’ values and interests. We are agnostic about, and for 
present purposes need not take a stand on, the content of that criterion. 
31 By statute, even classified presidential papers are unsealed after 12 years. Presidential Records Act of 
1978, 44 U.S.C. § 2204 (Supp. 2 2000). However, President George W. Bush’s recent executive order may 
qualify this. See Exec. Order No. 13,333, 3 C.F.R. 815 (2001), reprinted in 44 U.S.C.A. §2204 (2001); 
Marcy Lynn Karin, Note: Out of Sight, but Not Out of Mind: How Executive Order 13,233 Expands 
Executive Privilege While Simultaneously Preventing Access to Presidential Records, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
529, 548-52 (2002). 
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leaders, but they approach the ideal of faithful agency more closely than do presidents 
with no such concern.  
We also assume that the voters’ ultimate preferences are fixed, so we put aside the 
possibility of presidential leadership that changes bedrock public values. However, 
voters’ derived preferences may change as their information changes, and this further 
blurs the significance of changing public values over time. On this view there is still 
scope for leadership, in the sense that a well-motivated president might choose a policy 
inconsistent with voters’ current ill-informed preferences, but consistent with the new 
preferences voters will form as their information changes, perhaps as a result of the 
policy itself. FDR’s behavior just before World War II is the model for presidential 
leadership in this sense. 
As this discussion suggests, the well-motivated executive may or may not keep 
campaign promises, or adopt popular policies. All depends on circumstances – on what 
the public would approve, if it knew what the president knows. A public that would 
condemn the president’s policy P might, if it knew more, approve of P. The well-
motivated president will want to adopt P in such circumstances, and will then face the 
problem of credibly signaling to the public that he favors the policy for good reasons that 
he cannot directly convey. Furthermore, we assume that the well-motivated executive 
will collect an optimal amount of information – up to the point where the marginal 
benefits of further information-gathering equal the marginal costs.32 This does not mean 
that the well-motivated executive always gets the facts right; he may turn out to be 
wrong. But it does mean that greater accuracy would not have been cost-justified.  
Against this benchmark of faithful agency, the problem is that a given president’s 
motivations might or might not be faithful, and the public knows this. The public fears 
that, for various reasons, the president might choose policies that diverge from the 
public’s optimal policies. These include: 
 1. The president cares more about national security (or more about civil liberties, 
but we will, for simplicity, assume the former) than the public does. His “preferences” 
are different from those of the public. 
 2. The president cares very little about national security and civil liberties; he 
mainly cares about maximizing his political power and, more broadly, political success—
success for himself, his party, or his chosen successor. With a view to political power and 
success, the president might maximize the probability of electoral success by favoring 
particular interest groups, voting blocs, or institutions at the expense of the public, or by 
adopting policies that are popular in the short-term, as far as the next election cycle, but 
that are harmful in the long-term, along with rhetoric that confuses and misleads. 
 The public knows that the president might have these or other harmful 
motivations, so when the president claims, for example, that a detention policy is 
essential to the war on terror but at the same time is not excessively harsh given its 
benefits, the public simply does not know whether to believe him. 
                                                 
32 This is a standard rationalist assumption. We will ignore a well-known problem of infinite regress that 
afflicts the economic theory of information: knowing the marginal benefit of the next bit of information 
itself requires information. See Jon Elster, Introduction, in RATIONAL CHOICE 1, 25 (Jon Elster ed., 1986).  
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 Crucially, the risk that the public will fail to trust a well-motivated president is 
just as serious as the risk that it will trust an ill-motivated one. Imagine that a well-
motivated president chooses the optimal policies. No terrorist attack occurs before the 
next election, but the public does not know whether this is because the president chose 
the optimal policies, the president chose bad policies and was merely lucky (as the 
terrorists for internal reasons chose to focus on foreign targets), or the president chose 
effective but excessively harsh policies. In the election, the public therefore has no 
particular reason to vote for this president and could easily vote him out of office and 
replace him with a worse president. A president who cares about electoral success might 
therefore not choose the optimal policies, and even a well-motivated president might be 
reluctant to choose the optimal policies because of the risk that the public will 
misinterpret them and replace him with an ill-motivated president. Presidents need public 
support even when they do not face reelection; they need the public to prod Congress to 
provide the president with funds for his programs and statutory authorization when 
necessary. A well-motivated president will abandon optimal policies if he cannot 
persuade the public that they are warranted. 
 As we noted earlier, legal scholars rarely note the problem of executive 
credibility, preferring to dwell on the problem of aggrandizement by ill-motivated 
presidents. Ironically, this assumption that presidents seek to maximize power has 
obscured one of the greatest constraints on aggrandizement, namely, the president’s own 
interest in maintaining his credibility. Neither a well-motivated nor ill-motivated 
president can accomplish his goals if the public does not trust him.33 This concern with 
reputation may put a far greater check on the president’s actions than do the reactions of 
the other branches of the government. 
B. Solutions 
 The literature on agency models and optimal contracting provides clues for 
solving the problem of executive credibility. This literature gives two basic pieces of 
advice.34 The first piece of advice is to align preferences. An employer will do better if 
her employees obtain utility from doing whatever actions benefit the employer. Suppose, 
for example, an employer seeks to hire someone to build furniture in a factory. The pay is 
good enough to attract job candidates who do not enjoy building furniture, but clearly the 
employer does better by hiring people who like working with their hands, and take 
pleasure in constructing a high-quality product, than by hiring people who do not like 
working with their hands. We say that the first type of person has a preference for 
building high-quality furniture; this person is less likely to shirk than the other type of 
person. 
 In order to align preferences, employers can use various types of screening 
mechanisms or selection mechanisms that separate the good types and the bad types.35 An 
old idea is that job candidates who completed a training program—here, in carpentry—
                                                 
33 See Marc J. Hetherington, The Political Relevance of Public Trust, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 791 (1998). 
34 For a general comparison of these two methods, see James Fearon, Electoral Accountability and the 
Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance, in DEMOCRACY, 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPRESENTATION, 55, 70-84 (Adam Przeworski & Susan C. Stokes eds., 1999).  
35 The enormous literature on this topic begins with A. Michael Spence, Job-Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. 
ECON. 355 (1973). 
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are more likely good types than job candidates who did not complete such a program. 
The reason is not that the training program improves skills, though it might; but that a 
person who enjoys carpentry is more likely to enter and complete such a program than a 
person who does not—the program, in terms of time and effort, is less burdensome for 
the former type of person. The employer could use other mechanisms as well, of course. 
She could ask for evidence that the job candidate pursues wood working as a hobby in his 
free time, or, simply, that he has held other jobs in similar factories, or jobs that involve 
carpentry or furniture construction. Another important screening mechanism is to 
compensate employees partly through in-kind components or earmarked funds that are 
worth more to good types than to bad types. In university settings, academic salaries are 
partly composed of research budgets that cannot be spent on personal goods and that are 
worth more to good types (researchers) than to bad types (shirkers).36 
 The second piece of advice is to reward and sanction. This is not as simple as 
giving the employee a bonus if she constructs good furniture and firing her if she does 
not; recall that we assume that the employer does not directly observe the quality of the 
agent’s action. Consider the following version of our example. The employees both 
design and construct furniture; “high-quality” furniture is both made well and pleasing to 
the public, so that it sells well. The employer cannot tell by looking at a piece of furniture 
whether it is high-quality because she does not know the tastes of the public. An 
employee who uses a high level of effort is more likely to produce furniture that sells 
well, but an employee can in good faith misestimate the public taste and produce 
furniture that sells poorly. Similarly, an employee who uses a low level of effort is less 
likely to produce furniture that sells well but nonetheless may succeed at times. Since the 
employer cannot observe the quality of the furniture, she cannot make the wage a 
function of its quality; if she pays a flat wage, then the employee does not have an 
incentive to engage in a high level of effort, because that involves more personal cost 
without producing any reward. 
 The main solution is to make the employee’s pay a function, in part, of the 
quantity of the sales of the goods that the employee produces. The quantity of sales, 
unlike the quality of the furniture, is observable. If the pay is properly determined, then 
the employer will engage in a high level of effort because the expected gains from high 
sales exceed the cost of high effort. How closely pay should be correlated with sales 
depends on how risk averse the employee is, and it may be necessary, for ordinary people 
who are generally risk averse, to pay them at least a little even if sales are low, and 
somewhat more if sales are high. 
 An enormous literature develops and qualifies these results, and we will refer to 
relevant parts of it later as necessary rather than try to summarize it here.37 For now, we 
want to briefly point out the relevance of these solutions to our problem of executive 
credibility. 
 The preference-alignment solution has clear applicability to the problem of 
executive credibility. To be sure, elections and other democratic institutions help ensure 
                                                 
36 Geoffrey Brennan, Selection and the Currency of Reward, in THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, 
257, 262-72 (Robert E. Goodin ed.,1996).  
37 See BOLTON, supra n. 29, at 169-70. 
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that the president’s preferences are not too distant from those of the public, but they are 
clearly not sufficient to solve the executive credibility problem. Elections will never 
create perfect preference alignment, for well-known reasons, and in any event the well-
motivated executive will do what the public would want were it fully informed, not what 
maximizes the chances of electoral success in the short run. Furthermore, we do not 
consider credibility-generating mechanisms that would require new constitutional or 
statutory provisions; of course the president has little or no power to redesign electoral 
rules in order to enhance his credibility. We will instead focus, in Part IV, on how the 
president might use the existing electoral system to enhance his credibility in indirect 
ways—by appointing subordinates, advisors, and commission members, and by 
supporting certain types of candidacies for electoral office. 
 The reward-and-sanction solution also is applicable to the problem of executive 
credibility, but we think it is of less importance and we will not address it in any detail. 
The problem that most concerns us—threats to national security—typically does not 
produce a clear outcome while the president is still in office. As noted above, Bush’s 
war-on-terror policies might be optimal, insufficient, or excessive; we will not know for 
many years. And the public cannot enter a contract with the president that provides that 
the president will receive a bonus if national security is enhanced and will be sanctioned 
if it is not enhanced. Consequently, Bush cannot enter a contract with the public that 
rewards him if his policies are good and punishes him if they are bad. 
 However, some signaling mechanisms have a reward-or-sanction component. A 
good job applicant can distinguish herself from a bad job applicant by agreeing to a 
compensation scheme that good types value and bad types disvalue. For example, if a 
good type of employee discounts future payoffs less than bad types, then good types will 
accept deferred compensation (such as pension contributions) that bad types reject.38 
Similarly, a well-motivated president can distinguish himself from an ill-motivated 
president by binding himself to a policy position that an ill-motivated president would 
reject. However, a president, unlike an ordinary employee, cannot bind himself by a 
judicially-enforceable contract; therefore, this mechanism can work only if the president 
can engage in self-binding through informal means, as we will discuss below.39 
 Note that either a well-motivated actor or an ill-motivated actor might use 
strategic devices to enhance her credibility. A bad actor might, for example, take actions 
to enhance the credibility of his threats. In a standard illustration, the “chicken” game 
occurs when two drivers race toward each other and the loser is the one who swerves to 
avoid death. In that game, each driver is threatening to drive straight, and the winner will 
be the one who can make his threat credible, because the other driver will then know that 
the only choice is to swerve or die. Credibility is a valuable adjunct to many different 
motivations, not just to socially beneficial ones. 
But this is a different type of credibility problem than the one we are interested in. 
In the class of problems we address, the problem that faces the well-motivated actor is 
that others cannot distinguish or sort him at a glance from ill-motivated actors. “Bad 
types” can mimic “good types” through low-cost imitation and by saying all the right 
                                                 
38 Id., at 228-32. This is a model that combines adverse selection and moral hazard.  
39 See Part IV.A., infra. 
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things. The good type needs some device whereby he can credibly signal that he is a good 
type. The answer, in general, is for the good type to undertake an action that imposes 
greater costs on bad types than on good types. If third parties understand the cost 
structure of the action, then this separates the two types, because the bad type’s strategy 
of costlessly imitating the good type no longer works. In employment screening, for 
example, both the lazy worker and the hard worker will claim to be a hard worker. The 
employer might prefer candidates with good references, or an advanced degree, on the 
theory that obtaining those things will be easier for the good type than the bad type.  
 Let us provide a little more structure to our analysis before describing our 
preferred mechanisms. Suppose that some president or other must choose a policy that 
will affect national security and civil liberties; this might include asking Congress to 
authorize him to engage in conduct like wiretapping or the use of military force. He 
makes this choice at the start of his first term, and the actual effect of his choice—on 
national security and civil liberties—will not be revealed to the public until after the next 
election. Terrorist attacks during the first term do not necessarily prove that he chose the 
wrong policies; nor does the absence of terrorist attacks during the first term prove that 
he chose the right policies. Only later will it become clear whether the president chose the 
optimal policies, perhaps many decades later. Thus, the public must vote for or against 
the president on the basis of the policy choice itself, not on the basis of its effect on their 
well-being. For expository convenience, we will assume that the president actually does 
make the optimal policy choice and that his problem is one of convincing the public that 
he has done so. Presidents who, for whatever reason, knowingly choose policies that the 
public would reject (if fully informed) obviously do not want to convince the public that 
this is what they are doing.  
Our focus, then, is how the president who chooses the optimal policy, given the 
information available to him and the relevant institutional constraints, might use some 
additional mechanism to enhance the credibility of his claim that he chose the best policy. 
In the next Part, we will address why our current Madisonian system does not already 
solve the problem of executive credibility. In Part IV, we will analyze some mechanisms 
by which presidents can bootstrap themselves into credibility. 
III. Madisonian Monitoring  
In the standard separation-of-powers theory attributed to Madison, the executive’s 
credibility dilemma is ameliorated by the separation of powers and institutional 
competition, which produce monitoring or oversight of executive discretion. Although 
the Madisonian system is not usually justified as a means of enhancing the executive’s 
credibility, that is a byproduct of the system: If checks and balances discourage ill-
motivated persons from running for election or force them to adopt public-spirited 
policies once in office, then the executive’s claims about his policies will be credible. 
Congressional and judicial oversight of executive action, on this account, will ensure that 
the executive exercises discretion only as directed by voter-principals, acting through 
legislators who are simultaneously agents (of the voters) and principals (of the 
executive).  
This account is no longer adequate, if it ever was. Legislators and judges are, for 
the most part, unable to effectively oversee or monitor the executive, especially in the 
 16
domains of foreign policy and national security. As a result, they are forced to the 
Hobson’s choice of granting discretion that an ill-motivated executive would abuse, or 
withholding discretion that a well-motivated executive would use for good.  
We do not suggest that the Madisonian system has entirely failed, only that it has 
partly failed, and that to the extent it has failed the executive’s credibility dilemma 
becomes more acute. We will examine some of the principal institutional problems, 
beginning with legislative oversight and then turning to the courts. 
A. Congress 
In the Madisonian vision, legislators are simultaneously principals of the 
president, who is supposed to execute the statutes that legislators enact, and are also 
institutional competitors of the president, who has freestanding constitutional powers 
beyond the execution of statutes. Voters elect legislators, who either transmit voters’ 
exogenously-determined policy preferences to the executive through statutes, or else (in a 
deliberative conception of Madisonianism) refine public preferences through reasoned 
discussion and then instruct the executive accordingly.40 We are agnostic on the question 
of whether the preference-based or deliberative version of the Madisonian vision is more 
persuasive, or exegetically more faithful to the Madison of the Federalist Papers. In either 
case, what matters here is that the combination of principal-agent relationships with 
institutional rivalry between legislators and the executive is supposed to produce valuable 
byproducts for the polity as whole. Legislators have an interest in monitoring the 
president not only to ensure that he faithfully executes the statutes they enact, but also to 
ensure that executive power does not swell beyond its constitutionally prescribed bounds 
and destroy the separation of legislative and executive powers. 
Whether or not this picture was ever realistic, it is no longer so today. Many 
institutional factors hamper effective legislative monitoring of executive discretion. 
Consider the following problems. 
 Information asymmetries. Monitoring the executive requires expertise in the area 
being monitored. In many cases, Congress lacks the information necessary to monitor 
discretionary policy choices by the executive. Although the committee system has the 
effect, among others, of generating legislative information and expertise,41 and although 
Congress has a large internal staff, there are domains in which no amount of legislative 
expertise suffices for effective oversight. Prime among these are areas of foreign policy 
and national security. Here legislative expertise is beside the point, because the 
legislature lacks the raw information that experts need to make assessments. 
 The problem would disappear if legislators could cheaply acquire information 
from the president, but they cannot. One obstacle is a suite of legal doctrines protecting 
executive secrecy and creating deliberative privileges42 – doctrines which may or may not 
be justified from some higher-order systemic point of view as means for producing 
optimal deliberation within the executive branch. Although such privileges are waivable, 
                                                 
40 JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, MILD VOICE OF REASON, 150-81, (1994); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES 
NEED DISSENT, 152-54 (2d ed. 2005).  
41 KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION, 254-57 (1991). 
42 For an overview of the deliberative privilege doctrine, see Michael N. Kennedy, Escaping the Fishbowl: 
A Proposal to Fortify the Deliberative Process Privilege, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1769 (2005). 
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the executive often fears to set a bad institutional precedent. Another obstacle is the 
standard executive claim that Congress leaks like a sieve, so that sharing secret 
information with legislators will result in public disclosure. The credibility dilemma 
becomes most acute when, as in the recent controversy over surveillance by the National 
Security Agency, the executive claims that the very scope or rationale of a program 
cannot be discussed with Congress, because to do so would vitiate the very secrecy that 
makes the program possible and beneficial. In any particular case the claim might be 
right or wrong; legislators have no real way to judge, and they know that the claim might 
be made either by a well-motivated executive or an ill-motivated executive, albeit for 
very different reasons.   
 Collective action problems. Executive officials worry that, with many legislators 
even on select intelligence committees, someone is bound to leak, and it will be difficult 
to pinpoint the source. Aware of the relative safety that the numbers give them, leakers 
are all the more bold. This is an example of a larger problem, arising from the fact that 
there are many more legislators than top-level executive officials. Compared to the 
executive branch, Congress finds it costlier to coordinate and to undertake collective 
action (such as the detection and punishment of leakers). To be sure, the executive too is 
a they, not an it. Much of what presidents do is to arbitrate internal conflicts among 
executive departments and to try to aggregate competing views into coherent policy over 
time. As a comparative matter, however, the contrast is striking: the executive can act 
with much greater unitariness, force and dispatch than can Congress, which is chronically 
hampered by the need for debate and consensus among large numbers. That comparative 
advantage is a principal reason why Congress enacts broad delegating statutes in the first 
place, especially in domains touching on foreign policy and national security. In these 
domains, and elsewhere, the very conditions that make delegation attractive also hamper 
congressional monitoring of executive discretion under the delegation.  
There may or may not be offsetting advantages to Congress’ large numbers; 
perhaps the very size and heterogeneity of Congress make it a superior deliberator, 
whereas the executive branch is prone to suffer from various forms of groupthink.43 But 
there are clear disadvantages to large numbers insofar as monitoring executive discretion 
is at issue. From the standpoint of individual legislators, monitoring is a collective good. 
If rational and self-interested, each legislator will attempt to free-ride on the production 
of this good, and monitoring will be inefficiently underproduced.44 More broadly, the 
institutional prerogatives of Congress are also a collective good.45 Individual legislators 
may or may not be interested in protecting the institution of Congress or the separation of 
legislative from executive power; much depends on legislators’ time horizons or discount 
rate, the expected longevity of a legislative career, and so forth. But it is clear that 
protection of legislative prerogatives will be much less in an institution composed of 
hundreds of legislators coming and going than if Congress were a single person. 
                                                 
43 Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 69-82 (2004). 
44 See generally, Sean Gailmard, Multiple Principals and Outside Information in Bureaucratic Policy 
Making, (U. Chi. Harris Sch., Working Paper, Dec. 2002), available at 
http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/About/publications/working-papers/pdf/wp_02_13.pdf (explaining that the 
high number of principals causes a suboptimal level joint utility from oversight). 
45 Levinson, Empire-Building Government, supra n. 4, at 928-32. 
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 “Separation of parties, not powers.”46  Congress is, among other things, a 
partisan institution. Political scientists debate whether it is principally a partisan 
institution, or even exclusively so.47 But Madison arguably did not envision partisanship 
in anything like its modern sense.48 Partisanship undermines the separation of powers 
during periods of unified government.49 Where the same party controls both the executive 
branch and Congress, real monitoring of executive discretion rarely occurs, at any rate far 
less than in an ideal Madisonian system. Partisanship may enhance monitoring during 
periods of divided government, as one House of Congress, say, investigates a president of 
the other party. However, monitoring is arguably most necessary during periods of 
unified government, because Congress is most likely to enact broad delegations when the 
President holds similar views;50 and in such periods monitoring is least likely to occur.51 
The Congress of one period may partially compensate by creating institutions to ensure 
bipartisan oversight in future periods – consider the statute that gives a partisan minority 
of certain congressional committees power to subpoena documents from the executive, 
albeit only nonprivileged documents52 – but these are palliatives. Under unified 
government, congressional leaders of the same party as the president have tremendous 
power to frustrate effective oversight by the minority party. 
 The limits of congressional organization. Congress as a collective body has 
attempted, in part, to overcome these problems through internal institutional 
arrangements. Committees and subcommittees specialize in a portion of the policy space, 
such as the armed forces or homeland security, thereby relieving members of the costs of 
acquiring and processing information (at least if the committee itself maintains a 
reputation for credibility).53 Intelligence committees hold closed sessions and police their 
members to deter leaks (although the sanctions that members of congress can apply to 
one another are not as strong as the sanctions a president can apply to a leaker in the 
executive branch). Large staffs, both for committees and members, add expertise and 
monitoring capacity. And interest groups can sometimes be counted upon to sound an 
alarm when the executive harms their interests.54  
Overall, however, these arrangements are not fully adequate, especially in 
domains of foreign policy and national security, where the scale of executive operations 
is orders of magnitude larger than the scale of congressional operations. Congress’ whole 
staff, which must (with the help of interest groups) monitor all issues, runs to some 
22,000 persons.55 As of 2003, the executive branch had some 2.6 million civilian 
                                                 
46 Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 
2311 (2006).  
47 See, e.g., GARY W. COX & MATTHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN REVISITED: 
RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, (2005), available at 
http://www.iq.harvard.edu/NewsEvents/Conferences/EWA/Jan04/LLR--Harvard_final.pdf.  
48 BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS, 18, 24-25 (2005).  
49 Levinson & Pildes, supra n. 46 at 2342-47. 
50 DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS, 235 (2d ed. 1999). 
51 Levinson & Pildes, supra n. 46 at 2359-64,  
52 5 U.S.C. 2954 (Supp. 2 2000). 
53 KREHBIEL, supra n. 41, at 68-69, 74-75. 
54 Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols 
Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 168-171 (1984).  
55 NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN ET AL., VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 2001-2002 126 (2002). 
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employees,56 in addition to almost 1.2 million in the armed forces.57 The sheer mismatch 
between the scale of executive operations and the congressional capacity for oversight, 
even aided by interest groups, is daunting. Probably Congress is already at or near the 
limits of its monitoring capacity at its current size and budget. 
 Congressional motivation and credibility. Like the executive, Congress has a 
credibility problem. Members of Congress may be well-motivated or ill-motivated; the 
public does not know. Thus, when Congress passes a resolution criticizing presidential 
action or refuses to delegate power that he seeks, observers do not know whether 
Congress or the president is right. Ill-motivated members of Congress will constrain 
public-spirited presidents; thus the Madisonian cure for the problem of executive 
credibility could be worse than the disease. 
Even if members of Congress are generally well-motivated, Congress has a 
problem of institutional credibility that the president lacks. Although a voter might trust 
the member of Congress for whom she voted because she knows about his efforts on his 
district’s behalf, she will usually know nothing about other members of Congress, so 
when her representative is outvoted, she might well believe that the other members are 
ill-motivated. And, with respect to her own representative, he will often lack credibility 
compared to the president because he has much less information. Further, the reputation 
of congressional leaders is only very loosely tied to the reputation of the institution, while 
there is a closer tie between the president’s reputation and the presidency. As a result, 
Congress is likely to act less consistently than the presidency, further reducing its relative 
credibility. Congressional lack of credibility undermines its ability to constrain the 
presidency: Congress can monitor the president and tell the public that the president has 
acted properly or improperly, but if the public does not believe Congress, then 
Congress’s power to check the president is limited. 
 We neither make nor need to make any general empirical claim that Congress has 
no control over executive discretion. That is surely not the case; there is a large debate, or 
set of related debates, about the extent of congressional dominance.58 Our assertion is just 
that there is at least a real gap, and during emergencies and wars an even larger gap, 
between the extent of executive discretion and legislative capacity for monitoring. Within 
that gap, the dilemma of executive credibility arises. To the extent that legislators cannot 
monitor the executive’s exercise of discretion, they must either withhold discretion from 
an executive who might be well-motivated, or grant discretion to an executive who might 
be ill-motivated. 
 B. Courts 
                                                 
56 United States Office of Personnel Management, Federal Civilian Employment by Branch, Selected 
Agency, Pay System and Area, December 2005 and January 2006,  
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58 See, e.g., Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? 
Rgulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983); Terry Moe, An 
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 Similar problems afflict judicial oversight of the executive. 
 Information asymmetries. The gap between executive and judiciary, in 
information and expertise, is even wider than between the executive and Congress. 
Whereas many legislators have a narrowly defined field of policy expertise, particularly 
in the House, federal judges are mostly generalists, barring a few specialized courts. 
Furthermore, the partial insulation from current politics that federal judges enjoy, by 
virtue of life tenure and salary protection, brings with it a kind of informational 
impoverishment.59 Legislators, who must please other people at least some of the time, 
interact with the outside world far more systematically than generalist judges, whose 
main source of information is the briefs and arguments of litigants. The credibility 
dilemma thus appears quite acutely in judicial proceedings. When the executive says that 
resolving a plaintiff’s claim would require disclosure of “state secrets,”60 with dangerous 
consequences for national security, judges know that an either an ill-motivated or a well-
motivated executive might be making the claim and know that they have no easy means 
to assess whether the claim is credible. 
 Collective action problems and decentralization. If congressional monitoring of 
executive discretion is hampered by collective action problems, judicial monitoring is 
hampered by a similar condition, the decentralized character of the federal judiciary. The 
judiciary really is a they, not an it, and is decentralized along mainly geographic lines. 
Different judges on different courts will have different prior estimates of the executive’s 
credibility, and hence different views of the costs and benefits of oversight and of the 
appropriate level of monitoring. The Supreme Court is incapable of fully resolving these 
structural conflicts. Because the Court presides over a large institutional system and lacks 
the capacity to review more than a fraction of cases submitted to it, its role is restricted by 
necessity to the declaration of general principles of law and episodic, ad hoc intervention 
in the system.61 
 The legitimacy deficit. In the federal system, appointed judges are not overtly 
partisan, though they are sometimes covertly so.62 The very condition that enables this 
relative lack of overt politicization – that federal judges are, at least in one familiar 
conception, legal technocrats appointed for their expertise rather than elected on a 
partisan basis – also creates a serious legitimacy deficit for the judiciary, understanding 
legitimacy in a strictly sociological sense.63 Aroused publics concerned about issues such 
as national security sometimes have little tolerance for robust judicial oversight of 
executive discretion, which can always be condemned as “activism” by “unelected 
judges.” This charge sometimes succeeds and sometimes fails, but for the judges it is 
always a concern that acts as a drag on attempts to monitor executive behavior. 
 Judicial credibility. Judges rely on executive officials to carry out their orders and 
Congress to fund them, and thus ultimately on the public imposing sanctions on the 
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60 See, e.g., Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 8-11 (2005), Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 347 (4th Cir. 2005), 
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62 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-10 (2000). 
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political branches when the political branches do not obey a court order. But the public 
will support the judiciary only if the public believes that the judiciary is well-motivated 
rather than ill-motivated. Such is often the case,64 but the credibility of judges is not 
infinite. Lingering public suspicion of elite decisionmaking places a cap on judicial 
credibility, and indeed the evidence suggests that judges are often motivated by ideology, 
at least when it comes to opinion assignment.65 Thus, as we have mentioned before, as 
between a presidential determination that an emergency requires a course of action and a 
judge’s claim to the contrary, the public might well believe the president.66 
 Here too, we do not claim that judicial oversight is a total failure. Doctrinal 
lawyers focus, sometimes to excess, on a handful of great cases in which judges have 
checked or constrained discretionary executive action, even in domains involving foreign 
policy or national security. Cases such as Youngstown,67 the Pentagon Papers case,68 and 
recently Hamdan69 head this list. Undoubtedly, however, there is a large gap between 
executive discretion and judicial capacities, or even between executive discretion and the 
sum of congressional and judicial capacities working in tandem. In times of emergency, 
especially, both Congress and the judiciary defer to the executive.70 Legislators and 
judges understand that the executive’s comparative institutional advantages in secrecy, 
force, and unitariness are all the more useful during emergencies, so that it is worthwhile 
transferring more discretion to the executive even if it results in an increased risk of 
executive abuse. The result is that cases such as the ones we have listed are the exception, 
not the rule, at least during the heat of the emergency.  
 C. The Madisonian System and the Well-Motivated Executive 
  The Madisonian system of oversight has not totally failed. Sometimes it works. 
Sometimes legislators throw off the temptation to free-ride; sometimes they invest in 
protecting the separation of powers or legislative prerogatives. Sometimes judges review 
exercises of executive discretion, even during emergencies. But often enough, legislators 
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and judges have no real alternative to letting executive officials exercise discretion 
unchecked. The Madisonian system is a partial failure; compensating mechanisms must 
be adopted to fill the area of slack, the institutional gap between executive discretion and 
the oversight capacities of other institutions.  
It is often assumed that this partial failure of the Madisonian system unshackles 
and therefore benefits ill-motivated executives. This is far too crude and also incomplete. 
The failure of the Madisonian system harms the well-motivated executive as much as it 
benefits the ill-motivated one. Where Madisonian oversight fails, the well-motivated 
executive is a victim of his own power. Voters, legislators, and judges will be wary of 
granting further discretion to an executive whose motivations are uncertain and possibly 
nefarious. The partial failure of Madisonian oversight thus threatens a form of 
inefficiency, a kind of contracting failure that makes potentially everyone – including the 
voters – worse off. 
Our central question, then, is what the well-motivated executive can do to solve or 
at least ameliorate the problem. The solution is for the executive to complement his 
(well-motivated) first-order policy goals with second-order mechanisms for 
demonstrating credibility to other actors. We thus do not address the different question of 
what voters, legislators, judges and other actors should do about an executive who is ill-
motivated and known to be so. That project involves shoring up or replacing the 
Madisonian system to block executive dictatorship. Our more modest project involves 
finding new mechanisms to help the well-motivated executive credibly distinguish 
himself as such. 
IV. Executive Signaling: Law and Mechanisms  
We suggest that the executive’s credibility problem can be solved by second-
order mechanisms of executive signaling. In the general case, well-motivated executives 
send credible signals by taking actions that are more costly for ill-motivated actors than 
for well-motivated ones, thus distinguishing themselves from their ill-motivated mimics. 
Among the specific mechanisms we discuss, an important subset involve executive self-
binding, whereby executives commit themselves to a course of action that would impose 
higher costs on ill-motivated actors. Commitments themselves have value as signals of 
benign motivations. 
This departs from the usual approach in legal scholarship. Legal theory has often 
discussed self-binding by “government” or government officials. In constitutional theory, 
it is often suggested that constitutions represent an attempt by “the people” to bind 
“themselves” against their own future decisionmaking pathologies, or relatedly that 
constitutional prohibitions represent mechanisms by which governments commit 
themselves not to expropriate investments or to exploit their populations.71 Whether or 
not this picture is coherent,72 it is not the question we examine here, although some of the 
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relevant considerations are similar.73 We are not concerned with binding the president so 
that he cannot abuse his powers, but with how he might bind himself or take other actions 
that enhance his credibility, so that he can generate support from the public and other 
members of the government. 
Furthermore, our question is subconstitutional; it is whether a well-motivated 
executive, acting within an established set of constitutional and statutory rules, can use 
signaling to generate public trust. Accordingly we proceed by assuming that no 
constitutional amendments or new statutes will be enacted. Within these constraints, what 
can a well-motivated executive do to bootstrap himself to credibility? The problem for 
the well-motivated executive is to credibly signal his benign motivations; in general, the 
solution is to engage in actions that are less costly for good types than for bad types. 
We begin with some relevant law; then examine a set of possible mechanisms, 
emphasizing both the conditions under which they might succeed and the conditions 
under which they might not; and then examine the costs of credibility. 
A. A Preliminary Note on Law and Self-Binding 
Many of our mechanisms are unproblematic from a legal perspective, as they 
involve presidential actions that are clearly lawful. But a few raise legal questions; in 
particular, those that involve self-binding.74 Can a president bind himself to respect 
particular first-order policies? With qualifications, the answer is “yes, at least to the same 
extent that a legislature can.” Formally, a duly promulgated executive rule or order binds 
even the executive unless and until it is validly abrogated, thereby establishing a new 
legal status quo.75 The legal authority to establish a new status quo allows a president to 
create inertia or political constraints that will affect his own future choices. In a practical 
sense, presidents, like legislatures, have great de facto power to adopt policies that shape 
the legal landscape for the future. A president might commit himself to a long-term 
project of defense procurement or infrastructure or foreign policy, narrowing his own 
future choices and generating new political coalitions that will act to defend the new rules 
or policies. 
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More schematically, we may speak of formal and informal means of self-binding:  
(1) The president might use formal means to bind himself. This is possible in the 
sense that an executive order, if otherwise valid, legally binds the president while it is in 
effect and may be enforced by the courts. It is not possible in the sense that the president 
can always repeal the executive order if he can bear the political and reputational costs of 
doing so.  
(2) The president might use informal means to bind himself. This is not only 
possible but frequent and important. Issuing an executive rule providing for the 
appointment of special prosecutors, as Nixon did, is not a formal self-binding.76 
However, there may be large political costs to repealing the order. This effect does not 
depend on the courts’ willingness to enforce the order, even against Nixon himself. Court 
enforcement makes the order legally binding while it is in place, but only political and 
reputational enforcement can protect it from repeal. Just as a dessert addict might 
announce to his friends that he is going on a no-dessert diet in order to raise the 
reputational costs of backsliding and thus commit himself, so too the repeal of an 
executive order may be seen as a breach of faith even if no other institution ever enforces 
it. 
In what follows, we will invoke both formal and informal mechanisms. For our 
purposes, the distinction between the authority to engage in de jure self-binding (legally 
limited and well-defined) and the power to engage in de facto self-binding (broad and 
amorphous) is secondary. So long as policies are deliberately chosen with a view to 
generating credibility, and do so by constraining the president’s own future choices in 
ways that impose greater costs on ill-motivated presidents than on well-motivated ones, it 
does not matter whether the constraint is formal or informal. 
B. Mechanisms 
What signaling mechanisms might a well-motivated executive adopt to credibly 
assure voters, legislators and judges that his policies rest on judgments about the public 
interest, rather than on power-maximization, partisanship or other nefarious motives? 
Intrabranch separation of powers. In an interesting treatment of related problems, 
Neal Katyal suggests that the failure of the Madisonian system counsels “internal 
separation of powers” within the executive branch.77 Abdication by Congress means that 
there are few effective checks on executive power; second-best substitutes are necessary. 
Katyal proposes some mechanisms that would be adopted by Congress, such as oversight 
hearings by the minority party, but his most creative proposals are for arrangements 
internal to the executive branch, such as redundancy and competition among agencies, 
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stronger civil-service protections and internal adjudication of executive controversies by 
insulated “executive” decisionmakers who resemble judges in many ways.78  
Katyal’s argument is relevant because the mechanisms he discusses might be 
understood as signaling devices, but his overall approach is conceptually flawed, on two 
grounds. First, the assumption that second-best constraints on the executive should 
reproduce the Madisonian separation of powers within the executive branch is never 
defended. The idea seems to be that this is as close as we can get to the first-best, while 
holding constant everything else in our constitutional order. But the general theory of 
second-best states that approaching as closely as possible to the first-best will not 
necessarily be the preferred strategy;79 the best approach may be to adjust matters on 
other margins as well, in potentially unpredictable ways. If the Madisonian system has 
failed in the ways Katyal suggests, the best compensating adjustment might be, for all we 
know, to switch to a parliamentary system. (We assume that no large-scale changes of 
this sort are possible, whereas Katyal seemingly assumes that they are, or at least does 
not make clear his assumptions in this regard). Overall, Katyal’s view has a kind of 
fractal quality – each branch should reproduce within itself the very same separation of 
powers structure that also describes the whole system – but it is not explained why the 
constitutional order should be fractal.  
Second, Katyal’s proposals for internal separation of powers are self-defeating: 
the motivations that Katyal ascribes to the executive are inconsistent with the executive 
adopting or respecting the prescriptions Katyal recommends.80 Katyal never quite says so 
explicitly, but he clearly envisions the executive as a power-maximizing actor, in the 
sense that the president seeks to remove all constraints on his current choices.81 Such an 
executive would not adopt or enforce the internal separation of powers to check himself. 
Executive signaling is not, even in principle, a solution to the lack of constraints on a 
power-maximizing executive in the sense Katyal implicitly intends. Although an ill-
motivated executive might bind himself to enhance his strategic credibility, as explained 
above, he would not do so in order to restore the balance of powers. Nor is it possible, 
given Katyal’s premise of legislative passivity or abdication, that Congress would force 
the internal separation of powers on the executive. In what follows, we limit ourselves to 
proposals that are consistent with the motivations, beliefs, and political opportunities that 
we ascribe to the well-motivated executive, to whom the proposals are addressed. This 
limitation ensures that the proposals are not self-defeating, whatever their costs.  
The contrast here must not be drawn too simply. A well-motivated executive, in 
our sense, might well attempt to increase his power. The very point of demonstrating 
credibility is to encourage voters and legislators to increase the discretionary authority of 
the executive, where all will be made better off by doing so. Scholars such as Katyal who 
implicitly distrust the executive, however, do not subscribe to this picture of executive 
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motivations. Rather, they see the executive as an unfaithful agent of the voters; the 
executive attempts to maximize his power even where fully-informed voters would prefer 
otherwise. An actor of that sort will have no incentive to adopt proposals intended to 
constrain that sort of actor. 
Independent commissions. We now turn to some conceptually coherent 
mechanisms of executive signaling. Somewhat analogously to Katyal’s idea of the 
internal separation of powers, a well-motivated executive might establish independent 
commissions to review policy decisions, either before or after the fact. Presidents do this 
routinely, especially after a policy has had disastrous outcomes, but sometimes 
beforehand as well. Independent commissions are typically blue-ribbon and bipartisan.82 
We add to this familiar process the idea that the President might gain credibility 
by publicly committing or binding himself to give the commission authority on some 
dimension. The president might publicly promise to follow the recommendations of such 
a commission, or to allow the commission to exercise de facto veto power over a policy 
decision before it is made, or might promise before the policy is chosen that the 
commission will be given power to review its success after the fact. To be sure, there will 
always be some wiggle room in the terms of the promise, but that is true of almost all 
commitments, which raise the costs of wiggling out even if they do not completely 
prevent it.  
Consider whether George W. Bush’s credibility would have been enhanced had 
he appointed a blue-ribbon commission to examine the evidence for weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq before the 2003 invasion, and publicly promised not to invade unless 
the commission found substantial evidence of their existence. Bush would have retained 
his preexisting legal authority to order the invasion even if the commission found the 
evidence inadequate, but the political costs of doing so would have been large. Knowing 
this, and knowing that Bush shared that knowledge, the public could have inferred that 
Bush’s professed motive – elimination of weapons of mass destruction – was also his real 
motive. Public promises that inflict reputational costs on badly motivated behavior help 
the well-motivated executive to credibly distinguish himself from the ill-motivated one. 
The more common version of this tactic is to appoint commissions after the 
relevant event, as George W. Bush did to investigate the faulty reports by intelligence 
agencies that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.83 If the president appoints 
                                                 
82 Other prominent commissions include the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President. 
Kennedy (the Warren Commission) and the President Johnson’s National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorder (the Kerner Commission), which reported on urban riots. For analysis of recent independent 
commissions, and for a sample of the diversity of issues covered by independent commissions, see, e.g., 
Victoria S. Shabo “We Are Pleased to Report that the Commission has Reached Agreement with the White 
House”: The 9/11 Commission and Implications for Legislative-Executive Information Sharing, 83 N. C. L. 
REV., 1037, 1037-50 (2005); Ken Gish & Eric Laschever, The President’s Ocean Commission: Progress 
Toward a New Ocean Policy, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 17, (Summer 2004); Nkechi Taifa Codification 
or Castration? The Applicability of the International Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination to the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 40 HOWARD L. J. 641, 660-64 (1997) (criticizing the 
1995 United States Sentencing Commission). 
83 COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, MARCH 31, 2005 (2005), available at 
http://www.wmd.gov/report/index.html. 
 27
after-the-fact commissions, the commissions can enhance his credibility for the next 
event—by showing that he will be willing, after that event, to subject his statements to 
scrutiny by public experts. Here, however, the demonstration of credibility is weaker, 
because there is no commitment to appoint any after-the-fact commissions in the future – 
merely a plausible inference that the president’s future behavior will track his past 
behavior. 
Bipartisan appointments. In examples of the sort just mentioned, the signaling 
arises from public position-taking. The well-motivated executive might produce similar 
effects through appointments to office.84 A number of statutes require partisan balance on 
multimember commissions; although these statutes are outside the scope of our 
discussion, we note that presidents might approve them because they allow the president 
to commit to a policy that legislators favor, thus encouraging legislators to increase the 
scope of the delegation in the first place.85 For similar reasons, presidents may consent to 
restrictions on the removal of agency officials, because the restriction enables the 
president to commit to giving the agency some autonomy from the president’s 
preferences.86 
Similar mechanisms can work even where no statutes are in the picture. As 
previously mentioned, during World War II, FDR appointed Republicans to important 
cabinet positions, making Stimson his Secretary of War. Clinton appointed William 
Cohen, a moderate Republican, as Secretary of Defense in order to shore up his 
credibility on security issues. Bipartisanship of this sort might improve the deliberation 
that precedes decisions, by impeding various forms of herding, cascades and 
groupthink;87 however, we focus on its credibility-generating effects. By (1) expanding 
the circle of those who share the president’s privileged access to information, (2) 
ensuring that policy is partly controlled by officials with preferences that differ from the 
president’s, and (3) inviting a potential whistleblower into the tent, bipartisanship helps to 
dispel the suspicion that policy decisions rest on partisan motives or extreme preferences, 
which in turn encourages broader delegations of discretion from the public and Congress. 
A commitment to bipartisanship is only one way in which appointments can 
generate credibility. Presidents might simply appoint a person with a reputation for 
integrity, as when President Nixon appointed Archibald Cox as special prosecutor 
(although plausibly Nixon did so because he was forced to do so by political constraints, 
rather than as a tactic for generating credibility). A person with well-known preferences 
on a particular issue, even if not of the other party or widely respected for impartiality, 
can serve as a credible whistleblower on that issue. Thus presidents routinely award 
cabinet posts to leaders of subsets of the president’s own party, leaders whose preferences 
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are known to diverge from the president’s on the subject; one point of this is to credibly 
assure the relevant interest groups that the president will not deviate (too far) from their 
preferences. 
 The Independent Counsel Statute institutionalized the special prosecutor and 
strengthened it. But the statute proved unpopular and was allowed to lapse in 1999.88 This 
experience raises two interesting questions. First, why have presidents confined 
themselves to appointing lawyers to investigate allegations of wrongdoing; why have 
they not appointed, say, independent policy experts to investigate allegations of policy 
failure? Second, why did the Independent Counsel Statute fail? Briefly, the statute failed 
because it was too difficult to control the behavior of the prosecutor, who was not given 
any incentive to keep his investigation within reasonable bounds.89 Not surprisingly, 
policy investigators would be even less constrained since they would not be confined by 
the law, and at the same time, without legal powers they would probably be ignored on 
partisan grounds. A commission composed of members with diverse viewpoints is harder 
to ignore, if the members agree with each other. 
More generally, the decision by presidents to bring into their administrations 
members of other parties, or persons with a reputation for bipartisanship and integrity, 
illustrates the formation of domestic coalitions of the willing. Presidents can informally 
bargain around the formal separation of powers90 by employing subsets of Congress, or 
of the opposing party, to generate credibility while maintaining a measure of institutional 
control. FDR was willing to appoint Knox and Stimson, but not to give the Republicans 
in Congress a veto. Truman was willing to ally with Arthur Vandenbergh but not with all 
the Republicans; Clinton was willing to appoint William Cohen but not Newt Gingrich. 
George W. Bush likewise made a gesture towards credibility by briefing members of the 
Senate Intelligence Committee – including Democrats – on the administration’s secret 
surveillance program(s), which provided a useful talking point when the existence of the 
program(s) was revealed to the public. 
Counter-partisanship. Related to bipartisanship is what might be called counter-
partisanship: presidents have greater credibility when they choose policies that cut 
against the grain of their party’s platform or their own presumed preferences.91 Only 
Nixon could go to China, and only Clinton could engineer welfare reform. Voters and 
publics rationally employ a political heuristic: the relevant policy, which voters are 
incapable of directly assessing, must be highly beneficial if it is chosen by a president 
who is predisposed against it by convictions or partisan loyalty.92 Accordingly, those who 
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wish to move U.S. terrorism policy towards greater security and less liberty might do 
well to support the election of a Democrat.93 By the same logic, George W. Bush is 
widely suspected of nefarious motives when he rounds up alleged enemy combatants, but 
not when he creates a massive prescription drug benefit. 
Counter-partisanship can powerfully enhance the president’s credibility, but it 
depends heavily on a lucky alignment of political stars. A peace-loving president has 
credibility when he declares a military emergency but not when he appeases; a belligerent 
president has credibility when he offers peace but not when he advocates military 
solutions. A lucky nation has a well-motivated president with a belligerent reputation 
when international tensions diminish (Ronald Reagan) and a president with a pacific 
reputation when they grow (Abraham Lincoln, who opposed the Mexican War). But a 
nation is not always lucky. 
Transparency. The well-motivated executive might commit to transparency, as a 
way to reduce the costs to outsiders of monitoring his actions.94 The FDR strategy of 
inviting potential whistleblowers from the opposite party into government is a special 
case of this; the implicit threat is that the whistleblower will make public any evidence of 
partisan motivations. The more ambitious case involves actually exposing the executive’s 
decisionmaking processes to observation. To the extent that an ill-motivated executive 
cannot publicly acknowledge his motivations or publicly instruct subordinates to take 
them into account in decisionmaking, transparency will exclude those motivations from 
the decisionmaking process. The public will know that only a well-motivated executive 
would promise transparency in the first place, and the public can therefore draw an 
inference to credibility. 
Credibility is especially enhanced when transparency is effected through 
journalists with reputations for integrity or with political preferences opposite to those of 
the president. Thus George W. Bush gave Bob Woodward unprecedented access to White 
House decisionmaking, and perhaps even to classified intelligence,95 with the expectation 
that the material would be published. This sort of disclosure to journalists is not real-time 
transparency – no one expects meetings of the National Security Council to appear on C-
SPAN – but the anticipation of future disclosure can have a disciplining effect in the 
present. By inviting this disciplining effect, the administration engages in signaling in the 
present through (the threat of) future transparency.  
                                                 
93 However, there is a puzzling finding that the counter-partisanship effect is asymmetrical: in experiments, 
hawkish “voters” approved of dovish policies chosen by a hawkish “president,” but dovish voters did not 
approve of hawkish policies chosen by a dovish president. See Lee Sigelman & Carol K. Sigelman, 
Shattered Expectations: Public Responses to “Out-of-Character” Presidential Actions, 8 POL. BEHAVIOR 
262, 274-76 (1986).  
94 John Ferejohn suggests, with a model, that agents might compete by offering their principals 
transparency, which lowers the costs to the principals of monitoring the agents, and thereby induces the 
principals to offer the agents greater discretion. See John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a 
Theory of Political Accountability, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION, 131 (Adam 
Przeworski et al. eds, 1999). Empirically, the evidence offers only mixed support for this model. See James 
Alt et al., The Causes of Fiscal Transparency: Evidence from the American States 25-30 (Feb. 2006), 
available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/kud/epruwp/06-02.html.  
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There are complex tradeoffs here, because transparency can have a range of 
harmful effects. As far as process is concerned, decisionmakers under public scrutiny 
may posture for the audience, may freeze their views or positions prematurely, and may 
hesitate to offer proposals or reasons for which they can later be blamed if things go 
wrong.96 As for substance, transparency can frustrate the achievement of programmatic 
or policy goals themselves. Where security policy is at stake, secrecy is sometimes 
necessary to surprise enemies or to keep them guessing. Finally, one must take account of 
the incentives of the actors who expose the facts—especially journalists who might 
reward presidents who give them access by portraying their decisionmaking in a 
favorable light.97   
We will take up the costs of credibility shortly.98 In general, however, the 
existence of costs does not mean that the credibility-generating mechanisms are useless. 
Quite the contrary: where the executive uses such mechanisms, voters and legislators can 
draw an inference that the executive is well-motivated, precisely because the existence of 
costs would have given an ill-motivated executive an excuse not to use those 
mechanisms. 
Multilateralism. Another credibility-generating mechanism for the executive is to 
enter into alliances or international institutions that subject foreign policy decisions to 
multilateral oversight. Because the information gap between voters and legislators, on the 
one hand, and the executive on the other is especially wide in foreign affairs, there is also 
wide scope for suspicion and conspiracy theories. If the president undertakes a unilateral 
foreign policy, some sectors of the domestic public will be suspicious of his motives. All 
recent presidents have faced this problem. In the case of George W. Bush, as we 
suggested, many have questioned whether the invasion of Iraq was undertaken to 
eliminate weapons of mass destruction, or to protect human rights, or instead to safeguard 
the oil supply, or because the president has (it is alleged) always wanted to invade Iraq 
because Saddam Hussein ordered the assassination of his father. In the case of Bill 
Clinton, some said that the cruise missile attack on Osama bin Laden’s training camp in 
Afghanistan was a “wag the dog” tactic intended to distract attention from Clinton’s 
impeachment.   
A public commitment to multilateralism can close or narrow the credibility gap. 
Suppose that a group of nations have common interests on one dimension – say, security 
from terrorism or from proliferation of nuclear weapons – but disparate interests on other 
dimensions – say, conflicting commercial or political interests. Multilateralism can be 
understood as a policy that in effect requires a supermajority vote, or even unanimity, 
among the group to license intervention. The supermajority requirement ensures that only 
interventions promoting the security interest common to the group will be approved, 
while interventions that promote some political agenda not shared by the requisite 
                                                 
96 Simone Chambers, Behind Closed Doors, Publicity, Secrecy, and the Quality of Deliberation, 12 J. POL. 
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97 Compare Woodward (blaming Tenet) and Suskind (blaming Bush) for the Iraq intelligence failure. Tenet 
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98 See infra ---. 
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supermajority will be rejected. Knowing this, domestic audiences can infer that 
interventions that gain multilateral approval do not rest on disreputable motives.  
It follows that multilateralism can be either formal or informal. Action by the 
United Nations Security Council can be taken only under formal voting rules that require 
unanimity. Informally, in the face of increasing tensions with Iran, George W. Bush’s 
policy has been extensive multilateral consultations and a quasi-commitment not to 
intervene unilaterally. Knowing that his credibility is thin after Iraq, Bush has presumably 
adopted this course in part to reassure domestic audiences that there is no nefarious 
motive behind an intervention, should one occur.  
It also follows that multilateralism and bipartisan congressional authorization may 
be substitutes, in terms of generating credibility. In both cases the public knows that the 
cooperators – partisan opponents or other nations, as the case may be – are unlikely to 
share any secret agenda the president may have. The substitution is only partial, however; 
as we suggested in Part III, the Madisonian emphasis on bipartisan authorization has 
proven insufficient. The interests of parties within Congress diverge less than do the 
interests of different nations, which makes the credibility gain greater under 
multilateralism. In eras of unified government, the ability of the president’s party to put a 
policy through Congress without the co-operation of the other party (ignoring the threat 
of a Senate filibuster, a weapon that the minority party often hesitates to wield) often 
undermines the policy’s credibility even if members of the minority go along; after all, 
the minority members may be going along precisely because they anticipate that 
opposition is fruitless, in which case no inference about the policy’s merits should be 
drawn from their approval. Moreover, even a well-motivated president may prefer, all 
else equal, to generate credibility through mechanisms that do not involve Congress, if 
concerned about delay, leaks, or obstruction by small legislative minorities. Thus Truman 
relied on a resolution of the United Nations Security Council rather than congressional 
authorization to prosecute the Korean War.99 
The costs of multilateralism are straightforward. Multilateralism increases the 
costs of reaching decisions, because a larger group must coordinate its actions, and 
increases the risks of false negatives – failure to undertake justified interventions. A 
president who declines to bind himself through multilateralism may thus be either ill-
motivated and desirous of pursuing an agenda not based on genuine security goals, or 
well-motivated and worried about the genuine costs of multilateralism. As usual, 
however, the credibility-generating inference holds asymmetrically: precisely because an 
ill-motivated president may use the costs of multilateralism as a plausible pretext, a 
president who does pursue multilateralism is more likely to be well-motivated. 
Strict liability. For completeness, we mention that the well-motivated executive 
might in principle subject himself to strict liability for actions or outcomes that only an 
ill-motivated executive would undertake. Consider the controversy surrounding George 
W. Bush’s telecommunications surveillance program, which the president has claimed 
covers only communications in which one of the parties is overseas; domestic-to-
domestic calls are excluded.100 There is widespread suspicion that this claim is false.101 In 
                                                 
99 S.C. Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/1501 (June 25, 1950), S. C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc S/1511 (June 27, 1950). 
100 Eugene Robinson, An Easy Call: Lying, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2006, at A21. 
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a recent poll, 26% of respondents believed that the National Security Agency listens to 
their calls.102 The credibility gap arises because it is difficult in the extreme to know what 
exactly the Agency is doing, and what the costs and benefits of the alternatives are. 
Here the credibility gap might be narrowed by creating a cause of action, for 
damages, on behalf of anyone who can show that domestic-to-domestic calls were 
examined.103 Liability would be strict, because a negligence rule – did the Agency exert 
reasonable efforts to avoid examining the communication? – requires too much 
information for judges, jurors, and voters to evaluate, and would just reproduce the 
monitoring problems that gave rise to the credibility gap in the first place. Strict liability, 
by contrast, would require a much narrower factual inquiry. Crucially, a commitment to 
strict liability would only be made by an executive who intended to minimize the 
incidence of (even unintentional and non-negligent) surveillance of purely domestic 
communications. 
However, there are legal and practical problems here, perhaps insuperable ones. 
Legally, it is hardly clear that the president could, on his own authority, create a cause of 
action against himself or his agents to be brought in federal court. It is well within 
presidential authority to create executive commissions for hearing claims against the 
United States, for disbursing funds under benefit programs, and so on; but the problem 
here is that there might be no pot of money from which to fund damages. The so-called 
Judgment Fund, out of which damages against the executive are usually paid, is restricted 
to statutorily-specified lawsuits. If so, statutory authorization for the president to create 
the strict liability cause of action would be necessary, as we discuss shortly.104 
Practically, it is unclear whether government agents can be forced to “internalize costs” 
through money damages in the way that private parties can, at least if the treasury is 
paying those damages.105 And if it is, voters may not perceive the connection between 
governmental action and subsequent payouts in any event.  
The news conference. Presidents use news conferences to demonstrate their 
mastery of the details of policy. Many successful presidents, like FDR, conducted 
numerous such conferences.106 Ill-motivated presidents will not care about policy if their 
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interest is just holding power for its own sake; thus, they would regard news conferences 
as burdensome and risky chores. The problem is that a well-motivated president does not 
necessarily care about details of policy, as opposed to its broad direction, and journalists 
might benefit by tripping up a president in order to score points. Reagan, for example, did 
not care about policy details, but is generally regarded as a successful president.107 To 
make Reagan look good, his handlers devoted considerable resources trying to prepare 
him for news conferences, resources that might have been better used in other ways.108  
“Precommitment politics.”109 We have been surveying mechanisms that the well-
motivated executive can employ once in office. However, in every case the analysis can 
be driven back one stage to the electoral campaign for executive office. During electoral 
campaigns, candidates for the presidency take public positions that partially commit them 
to subsequent policies, by raising the reputational costs of subsequent policy changes. 
Under current law, campaign promises are very difficult to enforce in the courts.110 But 
even without legal enforcement, position-taking helps to separate the well-motivated 
from the ill-motivated candidate, because the costs to the former of making promises of 
this sort are higher. To be sure, many such promises are vacuous, meaning that voters 
will not sanction a president who violates them, but some turn out to have real force, as 
George H.W. Bush discovered when he broke his clear pledge not to raise taxes. 
The possibility of statutory commitments. So far, we have proceeded on the 
austere assumption that no constitutional or statutory changes are allowed. We have 
confined ourselves to credibility-generating mechanisms that arise by executive signaling 
– commitments that the executive could initiate by legal order or by public position-
taking, without the permission of other institutions.  
However, this restriction may stack the deck too heavily against the solutions we 
suggest. A central example of the credibility problem, after all, arises when voters and 
legislators want to enact statutes transferring further discretion to a well-motivated 
executive, but are not sure that that is the sort of executive they are dealing with. In such 
cases, there is no reason to exclude the possibility that the executive might ask Congress 
to provide him with signaling mechanisms that he would otherwise lack. In the 
surveillance example, Congress is currently considering amendments to relevant statutes; 
many proposals are on the table.111 It is easy to imagine a well-motivated executive 
proposing that Congress explicitly ratify his authority to examine overseas 
communications, while also proposing – as a demonstration of credibility – that the 
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ratification be bundled with a statutory cause of action imposing strict liability for 
prohibited forms of surveillance. 
C. The Costs of Credibility 
The mechanisms we have discussed generate credibility, which is a benefit for 
voters and legislators who would like to increase the discretion of the well-motivated 
executive. What of the cost side? In each case, there are costs to generating credibility, 
although the character and magnitude of the costs differ across mechanisms.  
Signaling is by definition costly; the presence of a cost is what distinguishes ill-
motivated mimics, who are unwilling to incur the cost, from genuine good types. In this 
context, the inherent costliness of signaling means that the president must use time or 
resources to establish credibility with the public when, if voters were perfectly informed, 
that time and those resources could be expended directly on determining and 
implementing policy. But costs can be reflected in more subtle ways as well. Many of 
these mechanisms rely on the participation of agents who themselves may be ill-
motivated. Whistleblowers can cry wolf when there is no partisanship, merely substantive 
disagreement; journalists might offer not transparency but translucency, images distorted 
by their own biases and strategies. Miscellaneous costs arise in other ways as well. 
Multilateralism raises decision costs; transparency can harm deliberation; and so on.112  
Often the basic tradeoff facing presidents is that credibility is gained at the 
expense of control. Mechanisms such as creating independent commissions and pursuing 
multilateralism illustrate that to gain credibility, presidents must surrender part of their 
control over policy choices, partially constraining executive discretion in the present in 
return for more trust, which will then translate into more discretion in the future. The loss 
of control is a cost, even to the well-motivated executive. To be sure, the well-motivated 
executive may be more willing than the ill-motivated one to trade some loss of present 
control for increased future discretion, if the ill-motivated executive tends to be myopic 
or to discount the future more heavily; but it is not clear that is so – many terrifying 
dictators have been quite far-sighted – and in any event everything depends upon the 
particular tradeoff inherent in the particular case. 
Presidents are sometimes willing to pay the costs of credibility; often they are 
not.113 However, there is no general reason to assume that they will always do so when it 
is optimal to do so, and not otherwise. Presidents, like others, sometimes make mistakes, 
or overlook useful political tactics, or fail to choose the best means to serve their ends; 
that is what makes advice about policy mechanisms potentially useful. We do not urge 
that presidents should use credibility-generating mechanisms in every case, nor do we 
claim that the mechanisms we have offered are good for all times and places. Rather we 
have tried to indicate, at least in a general way, the conditions under which the benefits 
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will outweigh the costs, from the standpoint of the well-motivated executive and of the 
voters and legislators who wish to confer authority upon him. 
A general objection to our approach might emphasize the cost side, as follows. 
Whether the benefits outweigh the costs under particular circumstances is very hard for 
voters and legislators to judge. The ill-motivated executive can always claim that he has 
not adopted the credibility-generating mechanisms because of these costs; in that respect 
he can mimic a well-motivated executive who does genuinely believe that the costs 
exceed the benefits in the case at hand. Because of this second-order information gap, 
voters and legislators will still be unable to distinguish the good executive from the bad. 
This critique is overblown. For one thing, the very availability of these 
mechanisms, once generally known, indirectly provides the public with information even 
if they are not used, and indeed because they are not used. The failure to invite members 
of the other political party, or foreign nations, to participate in a crucial decision of 
foreign policy might cause voters to increase their skepticism about executive 
motivations. Relatedly, there is an asymmetry we have emphasized above: where the 
benefits really do exceed the costs, the well-motivated executive will employ the 
mechanisms, whereas the ill-motivated executive is less likely to do so, depending on 
whether use of the mechanisms happens to coincide with his strategic interests. Use of 
these mechanisms thus provides some evidence from which voters can infer that the 
executive is well-motivated. If the executive does not adopt (any of) the mechanisms, he 
might or might not be ill-motivated, but if he does adopt (some of) them, he is more 
likely to be well-motivated, so the mechanisms help voters and legislators to sort the bad 
from the good. The inference is evidential, not a logical necessity, but it is useful 
nonetheless.  
More generally, we do not deny that there will always be difficult cases in which 
the well-motivated executive should adopt a particular policy but has no way to persuade 
people that his motivations are public-spirited, because the costs of generating credibility 
really do exceed the benefits. But all we claim is that there is a substantial range of cases 
in which use of the mechanisms make all concerned better off. So long as voters have 
some information, then the well-motivated executive has the right incentives. The 
credibility mechanisms lie on a sliding scale: their value is lower the less voters can 
understand them, higher the more voters can understand them.  
Overall, it is sensible to think that there is a middle range in which voters’ 
information and competence is high enough that the credibility mechanisms are useful, 
but not so high that voters can just directly assess whether the executive has good 
motivations and is adopting optimal policies. Plausibly, the median of the electorate in 
the United States, and in other advanced democracies, falls in this middle range, most of 
the time. To be sure, it is hard to demonstrate, for each of the mechanisms we have 
surveyed, that the benefits exceed the costs under a significant range of circumstances. 
On the other hand, it is hard to demonstrate the contrary as well. Presidents and others 
have used them, or near relatives, at many points in the past, which gives some grounds 
for optimism that these mechanisms have real-world resonance.  
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Conclusion 
  For presidents, credibility is power. With credibility, the formal rules of the 
separation of powers system can be bargained around or even defied, as Lincoln and FDR 
demonstrated. Without credibility, a nominally powerful president is a helpless giant. 
Even if legal and institutional constraints are loose and give the president broad powers, 
those powers cannot effectively be exercised if the public believes that the president lies 
or has nefarious motives. 
 But presidential credibility can benefit all relevant actors, not just presidents. The 
decline of congressional and judicial oversight has not merely increased the power of ill-
motivated executives – the typical worry of civil libertarians. It also threatens to diminish 
the power of well-motivated presidents, with indirect harms to the public. Such presidents 
would, if credibly identified, receive even broader legal delegations and greater informal 
trust – from legislators, judges, and the public – than presidents as a class actually have. 
Absent other credibility-generating mechanisms, such as effective congressional 
oversight, presidents must bootstrap themselves into credibility through the use of 
signaling mechanisms. We suggest a range of such mechanisms, and suggest that under 
the conditions we have tried to identify, those mechanisms can make all concerned better 
off. 
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